University of Cambridge
Publishes on Protein Structure and Dynamics, Enzyme Structure and Function, RNA and protein synthesis mechanisms. 4 papers and 9.7k citations.
Add your photo, update your bio, and get notified when your ranking changes.
The Protein Data Bank is a computer-based archival file for macromolecular structures. The Bank stores in a uniform format atomic co-ordinates and partial bond connectivities, as derived from crystallographic studies. Text included in each data entry gives pertinent information for the structure at hand (e.g. species from which the molecule has been obtained, resolution of diffraction data, literature citations and specifications of secondary structure). In addition to atomic co-ordinates and connectivities, the Protein Data Bank stores structure factors and phases, although these latter data are not placed in any uniform format. Input of data to the Bank and general maintenance functions are carried out at Brookhaven National Laboratory. All data stored in the Bank are available on magnetic tape for public distribution, from Brookhaven (to laboratories in the Americas), Tokyo (Japan), and Cambridge (Europe and worldwide). A master file is maintained at Brookhaven and duplicate copies are stored in Cambridge and Tokyo. In the future, it is hoped to expand the scope of the Protein Data Bank to make available co-ordinates for standard structural types (e.g. alpha-helix, RNA double-stranded helix) and representative computer programs of utility in the study and interpretation of macromolecular structures.
Joint Vision 2020 asserts the United States military will achieve information superiority over any future adversary. This assertion is based on three assumptions: offensive information operations will provide an accurate and complete picture of an adversary, defensive information operations will prevent adversaries from attacking friendly information systems and the will of the US to overcome internal limitations to correctly interpret information will allow it to dominate the information realm against any opponent. However, evidence indicates these assumptions are flawed and the United States is vulnerable to strategic surprise. In fact, according to Eliot Cohen, one might usefully call the past dozen years the age of surprises The US government has been surprised by the end of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Persian Gulf War, the Asian Financial Crisis, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear detonations, and now the events of September 11, 2001. There is no reason to think the age of surprises is over, and there are many reasons to think we are still at its beginning."'