David Earnshaw

Abstract To date many assessments of the influence of the European Parliament have been general in nature: dealing with parliament as an undifferentiated entity and its policy impact in generalised terms. What this article argues is that the policy contribution of the EP cannot be adequately assessed in aggregate or absolute terms. Instead, recognition of the contingency of EP influence needs to be acknowledged. If the measurement of legislative influence is an enormously complex undertaking at national level, it is even more so in the context of EC ‘competitive federalism’. This article is concerned, therefore, with the ‘how’ ‐ the extent to which the EP exerts policy influence within specific policy areas; and the ‘why’ ‐ the variables that help to explain the variation in policy influence. Through case studies in the policy fields of the environment and research and technological development the differentials of influence exerted by the EP are examined.

This broad-ranging text examines the political dynamic of the European Parliament within the developing European Union and sets it in the broader context of comparative legislative analysis. To this end the authors analyze the roles performed by the European Parliament as a 'legislature;' its part in the EU's decision making process; and its contribution to crucial debates about democracy, legitimacy and the 'parliamentarization' of the European Union.

Using the analytical headings provided by John Fitzmaurice in his initial analysis of the co‐operation procedure in 1988, this article examines the perceptions of leading actors within the European Parliament (EP), and some of the officials most closely involved in the detailed discussion of legislative proposals within the Commission, about the co‐operation procedure in the 1989–94 parliament. It explores not only the assessment of ‘insiders’ of the EP’s legislative ‘effectiveness’ in this period, but also maps out how key participants viewed the changing interinstitutional patterns attendant upon the co‐operation procedure. The interviews in this study provide a unique perspective on what Fitzmaurice terms the ‘ratchet principle’ of institutional reform, and contribute to the historical record of institutional innovation within the EU.