Pablo T. Spiller

Journal Article The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation Get access Brian Levy, Brian Levy Senior Economist Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. This article is part of the World Bank project "Institutions, Regulation, and Economic Efficiency," undertaken with partial support from the World Bank Research Committee. We would like to thank Lee Alston, Hadi Esfahani, Ahmed Galal, Alice Hill, Matt McCubbins, Roger Noll, Douglass North, Mary Shirley, Ingo Vogelsang, Barry Weingast, Bjom Wellenius, Oliver Williamson, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, and Janet Mowery for editorial work. The opinions expressed here are entirely those of the authors, and do not represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Pablo T. Spiller Pablo T. Spiller Visiting Professor of Business and Public Policy Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. This article is part of the World Bank project "Institutions, Regulation, and Economic Efficiency," undertaken with partial support from the World Bank Research Committee. We would like to thank Lee Alston, Hadi Esfahani, Ahmed Galal, Alice Hill, Matt McCubbins, Roger Noll, Douglass North, Mary Shirley, Ingo Vogelsang, Barry Weingast, Bjom Wellenius, Oliver Williamson, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, and Janet Mowery for editorial work. The opinions expressed here are entirely those of the authors, and do not represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 10, Issue 2, October 1994, Pages 201–246, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036849 Published: 01 October 1994

The book assesses the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory structures and performance in the telecommunications industry in Jamaica, the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. These core institutions are shown to influence strongly the credibility and effectiveness of regulation, and thus its ability to encourage private investment and support efficiency. Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are often viewed as the solution to the problem of poor performance by telecommunications and other public utilities. This volume argues that these high expectations may not always be met because of the way a country's political and social institutions - its executive, legislative and judicial systems, its informal norms of public behaviour - interact with regulatory processes and economic conditions. In some environments, regulatory solutions run counter to the prevailing wisdom: achieving credible commitment may require an inflexible regulatory regime, and sometimes public ownership of utilities may be the only feasible alternative.

Mark P. Jones, Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo T. Spiller, Mariano Tommasi, Amateur Legislators -- Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 656-669

This article estimates a structural model of competition among hub-and-spoke airlines in order to measure the strength of economies of traffic density on individual route segments. We find that economies of density were strong during the sample period (fourth quarter 1985), stronger than previous estimates by Douglas Caves, Laurits Christensen, and Michael Tretheway derived from traditional cost-function methods. We also find that the airlines' competitive behavior was far from collusive in the markets under study (markets requiring a connection at a hub airport). Our structural model also provides plausible estimates of demand elasticities. We use our estimates to provide a cost-based rationale for the major changes in the structure of the industry following deregulation (for example, the increase in airport and industry-wide concentration, and the increase in competition at the city-pair market level) and to simulate the effects of a merger of airlines that share a hub.

The book assesses the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory structures and performance in the telecommunications industry in Jamaica, the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. These core institutions are shown to influence strongly the credibility and effectiveness of regulation, and thus its ability to encourage private investment and support efficiency. Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are often viewed as the solution to the problem of poor performance by telecommunications and other public utilities. This volume argues that these high expectations may not always be met because of the way a country's political and social institutions - its executive, legislative and judicial systems, its informal norms of public behaviour - interact with regulatory processes and economic conditions. In some environments, regulatory solutions run counter to the prevailing wisdom: achieving credible commitment may require an inflexible regulatory regime, and sometimes public ownership of utilities may be the only feasible alternative