Laura K. Borkenhagen

The diversity of influenza A viruses (IAV) is primarily hosted by two highly divergent avian orders: Anseriformes (ducks, swans and geese) and Charadriiformes (gulls, terns and shorebirds). Studies of IAV have historically focused on Anseriformes, specifically dabbling ducks, overlooking the diversity of hosts in nature, including gull and goose species that have successfully adapted to human habitats. This study sought to address this imbalance by characterizing spillover dynamics and global transmission patterns of IAV over 10 years at greater taxonomic resolution than previously considered. Furthermore, the circulation of viral subtypes in birds that are either host-adapted (low pathogenic H13, H16) or host-generalist (highly pathogenic avian influenza-HPAI H5) provided a unique opportunity to test and extend models of viral evolution. Using Bayesian phylodynamic modelling we uncovered a complex transmission network that relied on ecologically divergent bird hosts. The generalist subtype, HPAI H5 was driven largely by wild geese and swans that acted as a source for wild ducks, gulls, land birds, and domestic geese. Gulls were responsible for moving HPAI H5 more rapidly than any other host, a finding that may reflect their long-distance, pelagic movements and their immuno-naïve status against this subtype. Wild ducks, long viewed as primary hosts for spillover, occupied an optimal space for viral transmission, contributing to geographic expansion and rapid dispersal of HPAI H5. Evidence of inter-hemispheric dispersal via both the Pacific and Atlantic Rims was detected, supporting surveillance at high latitudes along continental margins to achieve early detection. Both neutral (geographic expansion) and non-neutral (antigenic selection) evolutionary processes were found to shape subtype evolution which manifested as unique geographic hotspots for each subtype at the global scale. This study reveals how a diversity of avian hosts contribute to viral spread and spillover with the potential to improve surveillance in an era of rapid global change.

This year, in 2018, we mark 100 years since the 1918 influenza pandemic. In the last 100 years, we have expanded our knowledge of public health and increased our ability to detect and prevent influenza; however, we still face challenges resulting from these continually evolving viruses. Today, it is clear that influenza viruses have multiple animal reservoirs (domestic and wild), making infection prevention in humans especially difficult to achieve. With this report, we summarize new knowledge regarding influenza A, B, C and D viruses and their control. We also introduce how a multi-disciplinary One Health approach is necessary to mitigate these threats.

BACKGROUND: The large livestock operations and dense human population of Southeast Asia are considered a hot-spot for emerging viruses. OBJECTIVES: To determine if the pathogens adenovirus (ADV), coronavirus (CoV), encephalomyocarditis virus (EMCV), enterovirus (EV), influenza A-D (IAV, IBV, ICV, and IDV), porcine circovirus 2 (PCV2), and porcine rotaviruses A and C (RVA and RVC), are aerosolized at the animal-interface, and if humans working in these environments are carrying these viruses in their nasal airways. STUDY: This cross-sectional study took place in Sarawak, Malaysia among 11 pig farms, 2 abattoirs, and 3 animal markets in June and July of 2017. Pig feces, pig oral secretions, bioaerosols, and worker nasal wash samples were collected and analyzed via rPCR and rRT-PCR for respiratory and diarrheal viruses. RESULTS: In all, 55 pig fecal, 49 pig oral or water, 45 bioaerosol, and 78 worker nasal wash samples were collected across 16 sites. PCV2 was detected in 21 pig fecal, 43 pig oral or water, 3 bioaerosol, and 4 worker nasal wash samples. In addition, one or more bioaerosol or pig samples were positive for EV, IAV, and RVC, and one or more worker samples were positive for ADV, CoV, IBV, and IDV. CONCLUSIONS: This study demonstrates that nucleic acids from a number of targeted viruses were present in pig oral secretions and pig fecal samples, and that several viruses were detected in bioaerosol samples or in the nasal passages of humans with occupational exposure to pigs. These results demonstrate the need for future research in strengthening viral surveillance at the human-animal interface, specifically through expanded bioaerosol sampling efforts and a seroepidemiological study of individuals with exposure to pigs in this region for PCV2 infection.

Adenoviruses (AdVs) are major contributors to clinical illnesses. Novel human and animal AdVs continue to be identified and characterized. Comparative analyses using bioinformatic methods and Omics-based technologies allow insights into how these human pathogens have emerged and their potential for host cross-species transmission. Systematic review of literature published across ProQuest, Pubmed, and Web of Science databases for evidence of adenoviral zoonotic potential identified 589 citations. After removing duplicates, 327 citations were screened for relevance; of which, 74 articles received full-text reviews. Among these, 24 were included here, of which 16 demonstrated evidence of zoonotic transmission of AdVs. These documented instances of AdV crossing host species barriers between humans and non-human primate, bat, feline, swine, canine, ovine, and caprine. Eight studies sought to but did not find evidence of zoonosis. The findings demonstrate substantial evidence suggesting AdVs have previously and will continue crossing host species barriers. These have human health consequences both in terms of novel pathogen emergence and epidemic outbreaks, and of appropriate and safe use of non-human adenoviruses for therapeutics. As routine human clinical diagnostics may miss a novel cross-species adenovirus infection in humans, next generation sequencing or panspecies molecular diagnostics may be necessary to detect such incursions.

Here we review evidence for influenza A viruses (IAVs) moving from swine, avian, feline, equine, and canine species to infect humans. We review case reports, sero-epidemiological, archeo-epidemiological, environmental, and historical studies and consider trends in livestock farming. Although this focused review is not systematic, the aggregated data point to industrialized swine farming as the most likely source of future pandemic viruses, yet IAV surveillance on such farms is remarkably sparse. We recommend increased biosafety and biosecurity training for farm administrators and swine workers with One Health-oriented virus surveillance throughout industrialized farming and meat production lines. Collaborative partnerships with human medical researchers could aid in efforts to mitigate emerging virus threats by offering new surveillance and diagnostic technologies to livestock farming industries.