George Magklaras

BACKGROUND: Interaction data for a given protein may be spread across multiple databases. We set out to create a unifying index that would facilitate searching for these data and that would group together redundant interaction data while recording the methods used to perform this grouping. RESULTS: We present a method to generate a key for a protein interaction record and a key for each participant protein. These keys may be generated by anyone using only the primary sequence of the proteins, their taxonomy identifiers and the Secure Hash Algorithm. Two interaction records will have identical keys if they refer to the same set of identical protein sequences and taxonomy identifiers. We define records with identical keys as a redundant group. Our method required that we map protein database references found in interaction records to current protein sequence records. Operations performed during this mapping are described by a mapping score that may provide valuable feedback to source interaction databases on problematic references that are malformed, deprecated, ambiguous or unfound. Keys for protein participants allow for retrieval of interaction information independent of the protein references used in the original records. CONCLUSION: We have applied our method to protein interaction records from BIND, BioGrid, DIP, HPRD, IntAct, MINT, MPact, MPPI and OPHID. The resulting interaction reference index is provided in PSI-MITAB 2.5 format at http://irefindex.uio.no. This index may form the basis of alternative redundant groupings based on gene identifiers or near sequence identity groupings.

Purpose This paper presents the process of constructing a language tailored to describing insider threat incidents, for the purposes of mitigating threats originating from legitimate users in an IT infrastructure. Design/methodology/approach Various information security surveys indicate that misuse by legitimate (insider) users has serious implications for the health of IT environments. A brief discussion of survey data and insider threat concepts is followed by an overview of existing research efforts to mitigate this particular problem. None of the existing insider threat mitigation frameworks provide facilities for systematically describing the elements of misuse incidents, and thus all threat mitigation frameworks could benefit from the existence of a domain specific language for describing legitimate user actions. Findings The paper presents a language development methodology which centres upon ways to abstract the insider threat domain and approaches to encode the abstracted information into language semantics. The language construction methodology is based upon observed information security survey trends and the study of existing insider threat and intrusion specification frameworks. Originality/value This paper summarizes the picture of the insider threat in IT infrastructures and provides a useful reference for insider threat modeling researchers by indicating ways to abstract insider threats.

The 2011 AGM workshop took place at the Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência (IGC) in Oeiras, Portugal, from 23-25 May. The goal of the workshop was to build on the demonstrable progress made during the previous year, in particular by helping to deliver on some of the plans outlined during the 2010 AGM. It was also an opportunity to build on our commitment to take EMBnet forward by embracing new partners and new activities. The following pages summarise the workshop content, discussions and conclusions.