Timothy N. Cason

This paper examines participation in EPA's 33/50 program to assess the potential for voluntary environmental regulation to achieve improvements in environmental performance. The program's goal is to reduce the releases and transfers of 17 toxic chemicals by 50 percent between 1988 and 1995. The results indicate that the program has strong potential because large firms with the greatest toxic releases are most likely to participate. The results also identify a demand-based participation incentive, since participation rates are higher in industries with greater consumer contact. This suggests that public recognition is key to improving the success of voluntary environmental regulation.

This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects’ misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.

This paper introduces the team dictator game to study whether social dynamics within a group can cause groups’ decisions to differ systematically from individuals’ decisions. In the individual dictator game, a subject dictates the allocation of y dollars; in the team dictator game, a team of two subjects dictates the allocation of 2y dollars. We derive and test competing predictions for the two dominant psychological theories of group polarisation in this context. The data indicate that team choices tend to be dominated by the more other‐regarding member. This result is more consistent with Social Comparison Theory than Persuasive Argument Theory.