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Timothy Simcoe

Boston University

ORCID: 0000-0002-5950-660X

Publishes on Intellectual Property and Patents, Innovation Policy and R&D, Digital Platforms and Economics. 118 papers and 5.2k citations.

118Publications
5.2kTotal Citations

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Top publicationsby citations

The Economics of Reproducibility in Preclinical Research
Cited by 1.1kOpen Access

Low reproducibility rates within life science research undermine cumulative knowledge production and contribute to both delays and costs of therapeutic drug development. An analysis of past studies indicates that the cumulative (total) prevalence of irreproducible preclinical research exceeds 50%, resulting in approximately US$28,000,000,000 (US$28B)/year spent on preclinical research that is not reproducible-in the United States alone. We outline a framework for solutions and a plan for long-term improvements in reproducibility rates that will help to accelerate the discovery of life-saving therapies and cures.

CEO Overconfidence and Innovation
Alberto Galasso, Timothy Simcoe|Management Science|2011
Cited by 859Open Access

Are the attitudes and beliefs of chief executive officers (CEOs) linked to their firms' innovative performance? This paper uses a measure of overconfidence, based on CEO stock-option exercise, to study the relationship between a CEO's “revealed beliefs” about future performance and standard measures of corporate innovation. We begin by developing a career concern model where CEOs innovate to provide evidence of their ability. The model predicts that overconfident CEOs, who underestimate the probability of failure, are more likely to pursue innovation, and that this effect is larger in more competitive industries. We test these predictions on a panel of large publicly traded firms for the years from 1980 to 1994. We find a robust positive association between overconfidence and citation-weighted patent counts in both cross-sectional and fixed-effect models. This effect is larger in more competitive industries. Our results suggest that overconfident CEOs are more likely to take their firms in a new technological direction. This paper was accepted by Kamalini Ramdas, entrepreneurship and innovation.

Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting Organizations
Marc Rysman, Timothy Simcoe|Management Science|2008
Cited by 371

Voluntary standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are a common feature of systems industries, where firms supply interoperable components for a shared technology platform. These institutions promote coordinated innovation by providing a forum for collective decision making and a potential solution to the problem of fragmented and overlapping intellectual property rights. This paper examines the economic and technological significance of SSOs by analyzing the flow of citations to a sample of U.S. patents disclosed during the standard-setting process. Our main results show that the age distribution of SSO patent citations is shifted toward later years (relative to an average patent) and that citations increase substantially following standardization. These results suggest that SSOs identify promising technologies and influence their subsequent adoption.

Status, Quality, and Attention: What's in a (Missing) Name?
Timothy Simcoe, Dave M. Waguespack|Management Science|2010
Cited by 248

How much are we influenced by an author's identity when evaluating his or her work? This paper exploits a natural experiment to measure the impact of status signals in the context of open standards development. For a period of time, e-mails announcing new submissions to the Internet Engineering Task Force would replace individual author names with “et al.” if submission volumes were unusually high. We measure the impact of status signals by comparing the effect of obscuring high- versus low-status author names. Our results show that name-based signals can explain up to three-quarters of the difference in publication rates between high- and low-status authors. The signaling effect disappears for a set of prescreened proposals that receive more scrutiny than a typical submission, suggesting that status signals are more important when attention is scarce (or search costs high). We also show that submissions from high-status authors receive more attention on electronic discussion boards, which may help high-status authors to develop their ideas and bring them forward to publication. This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen, organizations.

Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms
Timothy Simcoe|American Economic Review|2012
Cited by 222

Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) use a consensus process to create new compatibility standards. Practitioners have suggested that SSOs are increasingly politicized and perhaps incapable of producing timely standards. This article develops a simple model of standard setting committees and tests its predictions using data from the Internet Engineering Task Force, an SSO that produces many of the standards used to run the Internet. The results show that an observed slowdown in standards production between 1993 and 2003 can be linked to distributional conflicts created by the rapid commercialization of the Internet. (JEL C78, L15, L86)