Cited by 1kOpen Access
University of California, Merced
Publishes on Child and Animal Learning Development, Language Development and Disorders, Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment. 54 papers and 4.2k citations.
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Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (Subsystem-2, SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds' false-belief reasoning extends to false beliefs about object identity. Infants watched events involving an agent and 2 toy penguins; 1 penguin could be disassembled (2-piece penguin) and 1 could not (1-piece penguin). Infants realized that outdated contextual information could lead the agent to falsely believe she was facing the 1-piece rather than the 2-piece penguin, suggesting that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about the identity of objects and providing new evidence for SS2 reasoning in the 2nd year of life.
Isochromosomal, respiratory-deficient yeast strains, such as a mit-, a hypersuppressive petite, and a petite lacking mitochondrial DNA, are phenotypically identical in spite of differences in their mitochondrial genomes. Subtractive hybridizations of complementary DNA's to polyadenylated RNA isolated from derepressed cultures of these strains reveal the presence of nuclear-encoded transcripts whose abundance varies not only between them and their respiratory-competent parent, but among the respiratory-deficient strains themselves. Transcripts of some nuclear-encoded mitochondrial proteins, like cytochrome c and the alpha and beta subunits of the mitochondrial adenosine triphosphatase, whose abundance is affected by glucose or heme, do not vary. In the absence of major metabolic variables, yeast cells seem to respond to the quality and quantity of mitochondrial DNA and modulate the levels of nuclear-encoded RNA's, perhaps as a means of intergenomic regulation.
Adults routinely make sense of others' actions by inferring the mental states that underlie these actions. Over the past two decades, developmental researchers have made significant advances in understanding the origins of this ability in infancy. This evidence indicates that when infants observe an agent act in a simple scene, they infer the agent's mental states and then use these mental states, together with a principle of rationality (and its corollaries of efficiency and consistency), to predict and interpret the agent's subsequent actions and to guide their own actions toward the agent. In this review, we first describe the initial demonstrations of infants' sensitivity to the efficiency and consistency principles. We then examine how infants identify novel entities as agents. Next, we summarize what is known about infants' ability to reason about agents' motivational, epistemic, and counterfactual states. Finally, we consider alternative interpretations of these findings and discuss the current controversy about the relation between implicit and explicit psychological reasoning.