Kevin P. Gallagher

Abstract In just over a decade, China has become a source of finance for emerging market and developing country governments. Recipient governments and the Chinese have been less than transparent with respect to the scale, terms and composition of this finance, engendering a great deal of speculation about its nature. This article provides preliminary estimates of Chinese finance to both Africa and Latin America since the turn of the century, with a specific focus on ‘commodity‐backed’ or ‘resource‐secured’ loans. We estimate that Chinese banks have provided approximately $132 billion in financing to African and Latin American governments and state‐owned firms since 2003. Just over half of these, or $75 billion, are in the form of resource‐secured finance. Contrary to many of the claims in the popular press, we found that Chinese finance is generally not out of line with interest rates found in global capital markets, does not bring windfall commodity profits to China, and does not mandate the use of Chinese workers.

ABSTRACT This article examines the emergence of Chinese development finance on the global stage and evaluates the extent to which it differs from, complements and/or competes with the Western‐backed development finance institutions. Whereas the new, China‐backed multilaterals are closer to the Western model, especially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this analysis finds that China's national development finance is significantly distinct along three parameters — the scale and business model of Chinese finance relative to its Western counterparts, the composition and approach of China's lending portfolio, and the governance of China's development finance institutions. These differences can be seen as complements to the Western‐backed system, given that much of Chinese development finance has flowed into countries and sectors in which Western development finance institutions have ventured to a lesser extent. However, the globalization of Chinese development finance, patterned on the international diffusion of what is coined in this article as the ‘coordinated credit space model’, contrasts with Western development finance, governance and business models, and has triggered a competitive stance from Western actors. Either contestation or convergence are possible trajectories for the future, and the outcome will be determined by whichever can produce conditions akin to the ‘politics of productivity’.

ABSTRACT The Doha Round negotiations at the World Trade Organization have come to a halt. The vast majority of analyses of the (at least temporary) demise of the Doha Round have focused on the lack of the United States and the European Union to reach consensus on the agricultural proposals that were tabled during the round. Relatively little attention has focused on explaining the rationale for why a large part of the developing world would not agree to proposals on the table as well. Many developing country negotiators claim that the potential benefits of the Doha Round were relatively small while the potential costs in terms of a loss of sovereignty to deploy effective development policies were significant. This paper argues that developing countries took a respite from the negotiations because the possible gains from market access were not large enough to trade for giving up domestic policy space for development policy.

Foreign investment has been widely perceived as a panacea for developing countries--as a way to reduce poverty and kick-start sustainable modern industries. The Enclave Economy calls this prescription into question, showing that Mexico's post-NAFTA experience of foreign direct investment in its information technology sector, particularly in the Guadalajara region, did not result in the expected benefits. Charting the rise and fall of Mexico's Silicon Valley, the authors explore issues that resonate through much of Latin America and the developing world: the social, economic, and environmental effects of market-driven globalization. In the 1990s, Mexico was a poster child for globalization, throwing open its borders to trade and foreign investment, embracing NAFTA, and ending the government's role in strengthening domestic industry. But The Enclave Economy shows that although Mexico was initially successful in attracting multinational corporations, foreign investments waned in the absence of active government support and as China became increasingly competitive. Moreover, the authors find that foreign investment created an enclave economy the benefits of which were confined to an international sector not connected to the wider Mexican economy. In fact, foreign investment put many local IT firms out of business and transferred only limited amounts of environmentally sound technology. The authors suggest policies and strategies that will enable Mexico and other developing countries to foster foreign investment for sustainable development in the future. Kevin P. Gallagher is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University and Senior Researcher at the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University. He is the author of Free Trade and the Environment: Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond and other books. Lyuba Zarsky is a Consultant and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Development and Environment Institute. She is a contributing editor of Investment for Sustainable Development: Balancing Rights and Rewards.

This special issue reviews patterns of policy stability and change at the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) since the G reat R ecession and attempts to explain their causes. The contributors show that the crisis ignited a reassessment regarding how the IMF would position itself as a pivotal player in global economic governance. Some new ideas and evidence definitely found their way into IMF decision making, but this process was often tempered by the nature of the institution and the powerful interests that control its governing structure. Where change did occur, its causal generators could be found in some combination between IMF staff politics, a string of innovations coming from academic and IMF economists, and the emerging economic powers' creative leveraging of institutional fora both within and inside the Fund.