Farsite

Atul Adya(Microsoft (United States)), William J. Bolosky(Microsoft (United States)), Miguel Castro(Microsoft (United States)), Gerald Cermak(Microsoft (United States)), Ronnie Chaiken(Microsoft (United States)), John R. Douceur(Microsoft (United States)), Jon Howell(Microsoft (United States)), Jacob R. Lorch(Microsoft (United States)), Marvin Theimer(Microsoft (United States)), Roger Wattenhofer(Microsoft (United States))
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
December 31, 2002
Cited by 794

Abstract

Farsite is a secure, scalable file system that logically functions as a centralized file server but is physically distributed among a set of untrusted computers. Farsite provides file availability and reliability through randomized replicated storage; it ensures the secrecy of file contents with cryptographic techniques; it maintains the integrity of file and directory data with a Byzantine-fault-tolerant protocol; it is designed to be scalable by using a distributed hint mechanism and delegation certificates for pathname translations; and it achieves good performance by locally caching file data, lazily propagating file updates, and varying the duration and granularity of content leases. We report on the design of Farsite and the lessons we have learned by implementing much of that design.


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