Suzanne Edwards

OBJECTIVES: The efficacy of lamotrigine as maintenance treatment for bipolar disorder (BD), particularly for delaying depressive episodes, is well established, but its efficacy in the acute treatment of bipolar depression is less clear. This paper reports the results of five randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trials of lamotrigine monotherapy for the acute treatment of bipolar depression. METHODS: Adult subjects with bipolar I or II disorder experiencing a depressive episode were randomized to placebo or lamotrigine monotherapy (after titration, at a fixed dose of 50 mg or 200 mg daily in Study 1; a flexible dose of 100-400 mg daily in Study 2; or a fixed dose of 200 mg daily in Studies 3, 4 and 5) for 7-10 weeks. RESULTS: Lamotrigine did not differ significantly from placebo on primary efficacy endpoints [17-item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale in Studies 1 and 2; Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS) in Studies 3, 4 and 5]. In Study 1, lamotrigine significantly separated from placebo on some secondary measures of efficacy, including the MADRS, the Clinical Global Impressions-Severity (CGI-S) and the CGI-Improvement (CGI-I), but seldom differed on secondary efficacy endpoints for the other studies. CONCLUSIONS: Lamotrigine monotherapy did not demonstrate efficacy in the acute treatment of bipolar depression in four out of five placebo-controlled clinical studies. Lamotrigine was well tolerated in the acute treatment of bipolar depression.

The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.

The development of antibiotics needs to be supported through new financial stimuli, including help from the public sector. In exchange for public support, industry should be asked to do what is in their power to help curb the inappropriate use of antibiotics. This work discusses key areas through which industry has an important influence on antibiotic consumption and where agreements can be made alongside financial incentives, even those intended to stimulate very early research. As long as the traditional unit sale-based business model for antibiotics remains in place, profit-making incentives will likely undermine efforts to sell and utilize antibiotics in a sustainable manner. In the short-term, while we try to come to a consensus on how best to fix the market, we need measures to prevent major over-selling and inappropriate promotion-especially for new, badly needed antibiotics that reach the market. This paper explores ways in which the pharmaceutical industry could help buttress sustainable antibiotic use while we search for more long-term, constructive, mutually-beneficial ways to organize the market.

BACKGROUND: As the growth of antibiotic resistance has resulted in large part from widespread use of antibiotics, every effort must be made to ensure their sustainable use. AIMS: This narrative review aims to assess the potential contribution of health economic analyses to sustainable use efforts. SOURCES: The work draws on existing literature and experience with health economic tools. CONTENT: The study examines some of the weaknesses in the health, regulatory, and industry arenas that could contribute to inappropriate or suboptimal prescribing of antibiotics and describes how economic analysis could be used to improve current practice by comparing both costs and health outcomes to maximize societal wellbeing over the longer-term. It finds that economic considerations underpinning current antibiotic prescribing strategies are incomplete and short-termist, with the result that they may foster suboptimal use. It also stresses that perverse incentives that drive antibiotic sales and inappropriate prescribing practices must be dis-entangled for sustainable use policies to gain traction. Finally, payment structures can be used to re-align incentives and promote optimal prescribing and sustainable use more generally. In particular, eliminating or altering reimbursement differentials could help steer clinical practice more deliberately towards the minimization of selection pressure and the resulting levels of antibiotic resistance. IMPLICATIONS: This work highlights the need for appropriately designed cost-effectiveness analyses, incentives analysis, and novel remuneration systems to underpin sustainable use policies both within and beyond the health sector.