Kenneth J. Rothman

Adjustments for making multiple comparisons in large bodies of data are recommended to avoid rejecting the null hypothesis too readily. Unfortunately, reducing the type I error for null associations increases the type II error for those associations that are not null. The theoretical basis for advocating a routine adjustment for multiple comparisons is the "universal null hypothesis" that "chance" serves as the first-order explanation for observed phenomena. This hypothesis undermines the basic premises of empirical research, which holds that nature follows regular laws that may be studied through observations. A policy of not making adjustments for multiple comparisons is preferable because it will lead to fewer errors of interpretation when the data under evaluation are not random numbers but actual observations on nature. Furthermore, scientists should not be so reluctant to explore leads that may turn out to be wrong that they penalize themselves by missing possibly important findings.

Misinterpretation and abuse of statistical tests, confidence intervals, and statistical power have been decried for decades, yet remain rampant. A key problem is that there are no interpretations of these concepts that are at once simple, intuitive, correct, and foolproof. Instead, correct use and interpretation of these statistics requires an attention to detail which seems to tax the patience of working scientists. This high cognitive demand has led to an epidemic of shortcut definitions and interpretations that are simply wrong, sometimes disastrously so-and yet these misinterpretations dominate much of the scientific literature. In light of this problem, we provide definitions and a discussion of basic statistics that are more general and critical than typically found in traditional introductory expositions. Our goal is to provide a resource for instructors, researchers, and consumers of statistics whose knowledge of statistical theory and technique may be limited but who wish to avoid and spot misinterpretations. We emphasize how violation of often unstated analysis protocols (such as selecting analyses for presentation based on the P values they produce) can lead to small P values even if the declared test hypothesis is correct, and can lead to large P values even if that hypothesis is incorrect. We then provide an explanatory list of 25 misinterpretations of P values, confidence intervals, and power. We conclude with guidelines for improving statistical interpretation and reporting.

Despite the growing popularity of propensity score (PS) methods in epidemiology, relatively little has been written in the epidemiologic literature about the problem of variable selection for PS models. The authors present the results of two simulation studies designed to help epidemiologists gain insight into the variable selection problem in a PS analysis. The simulation studies illustrate how the choice of variables that are included in a PS model can affect the bias, variance, and mean squared error of an estimated exposure effect. The results suggest that variables that are unrelated to the exposure but related to the outcome should always be included in a PS model. The inclusion of these variables will decrease the variance of an estimated exposure effect without increasing bias. In contrast, including variables that are related to the exposure but not to the outcome will increase the variance of the estimated exposure effect without decreasing bias. In very small studies, the inclusion of variables that are strongly related to the exposure but only weakly related to the outcome can be detrimental to an estimate in a mean squared error sense. The addition of these variables removes only a small amount of bias but can increase the variance of the estimated exposure effect. These simulation studies and other analytical results suggest that standard model-building tools designed to create good predictive models of the exposure will not always lead to optimal PS models, particularly in small studies.

1. Introduction to Epidemiologic Thinking 2. Pioneers in Epidemiology and Public Health 3. What is Causation? 4. Measuring Disease Occurrence and Causal Effects 5. Types of Epidemiologic Studies 6. Infectious Disease Epidemiology 7. Dealing with Biases 8. Random Error and the Role of Statistics 9. Analyzing Simple Epidemiologic Data 10. Controlling Confounding by Stratifying Data 11. Measuring Interactions 12. Using Regression Models in Epidemiologic Analysis 13. Epidemiology in Clinical Settings Appendix Index